Average postwar expansions are twice as long as prewar expansions, and contractions are one-half as long. This paper investigates three possible explanations. The first explanation is that shocks to the economy have been smaller in the postwar period. The second explanation is that the composition of output has shifted from very cyclical sectors to less cyclical sectors. The third explanation is that the apparent stabilization is largely spurious and is caused by differences in the way that prewar and postwar business-cycle reference dates were chosen by the NBER. 
Average postwar expansions are twice as long as prewar expansions, and contractions are one-half as long. This paper investigates three possible explanations. The first explanation is that shocks to the economy have been smaller in the postwar period. The second explanation is that the composition of output has shifted from very cyclical sectors to less cyclical sectors. The third explanation is that the apparent stabilization is largely spurious and is caused by differences in the way that prewar and postwar business-cycle reference dates were chosen by the NBER. The evidence presented in this paper favors this third explanation. (JEL N10, E32)
A key piece of evidence supporting the efficacy of aggregate-demand management is the observation that, on average, postwar business cycles in the United States have been less severe than in the prewar period. This argument, presented by Arthur Burns (1960) and subsequently investigated by other researchers, has been seriously challenged in a series of papers by Christina Romer (1986a Romer ( ,b, 1989 Romer ( ,1991 .1 Romer's argument is that the apparent stability of the postwar economy is largely an artifact of measurement error in the prewar data, which spuriously increases its volatility. However, much of the evidence supporting the contention of postwar stabilization has not relied on the volatility in specific series, but instead on the duration of business cycles calculated using the historical reference dates determined by researchers at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). These duration data suggest that the average length of recessions has fallen dramatically in the postwar period: during 1854-1929 contractions averaged 20.5 months, while during 1945-1990 they averaged 10.7 months; similarly over the same periods, prewar expansions averaged 25.3 months, while postwar expansions averaged 49.9 months. Francis Diebold and Glenn Rudebusch (1992) show that these prewarpostwar differences are statistically highly significant and robust to many of the changes in NBER business-cycle chronology debated in the historical literature. This paper investigates three explanations for this apparent stabilization of the postwar economy. The first explanation is that shocks to individual sectors of the economy have been smaller in the postwar period than in the prewar period. This may reflect a fortuitous exogenous change in the process generating shocks, or it may reflect effective government policy dampening the effects of exogenous shocks. The empirical
Phase Durations of Specific Series
The questions raised in the Introduction can only be resolved by comparing prewar and postwar data, and as Romer's work shows, extreme care must be exercised in such a comparison: the series used must be of consistent quality (either good or bad) across the prewar and postwar period. Unfortunately, data availability enforces a trade-off between coverage and sampling interval. The available annual data cover many sectors of the economy but are far from ideal for business-cycle analysis, since annual data can mask short or mild contractions. Monthly data are more useful, but there are few monthly series of consistent quality spanning a significant portion of the prewar and postwar period. Moreover, for both the monthly and annual data the requirement that the data be consistently measured in the prewar and postwar period means that series subject to large structural changes (new products, etc.) are necessarily omitted from the analysis. With these limitations noted, this section uses available monthly and annual data to uncover prewar-postwar changes in the average phase durations of "specific cycles" associated with these series.
Identifying specific cycles in economic time series requires precise definitions of a "contraction" and an "expansion." Unfortunately, the definition of contraction and expansion used by the NBER is too vague for this purpose.2 This paper uses an objec2Burns and Wesley Mitchell (1946) give the official definition of contractions and expansions. These are phases of the business cycle, which they defined as follows: Business cycles are a type of fluctuation found in the, aggregate economic activity of nations that organize their work mainly in business enterprises: a cycle consists of expansions occurring at about the same time in many economic activities, followed by similarly general recessions, contractions, and revivals which merge into the expansion phase of the next cycle; this sequence of changes is recurrent but not periodic; in duration business cycles vary from more than one year to ten or 26 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MARCH 1994 tive definition embedded in an algorithm developed by Gerhard Bry and Charlotte Boschan (1973) .3 This algorithm is a set of ad hoc filters and rules that determine business-cycle turning points in an economic time series. Essentially, the algorithm isolates local minima and maxima in a time series, subject to constraints on both the length and amplitude of expansions and contractions. For many series, the BryBoschan algorithm does a remarkably good job at reproducing the turning points selected by "experts." For example, Figure 1 shows monthly values of the logarithm of pig-iron production from 1877 to 1929. The horizontal lines on the graph are the turning points selected by the Bry-Boschan procedure; the arrows point to the turning points selected by Burns and Mitchell (1946) .4 Little difference between the BryBoschan and Burns-Mitchell peaks and troughs is evident. Consistent with practice at the NBER, the Bry-Boschan algorithm dates contractions and expansions using the level (or log level) of the series, rather than the detrended series. Thus, contractions correspond to sequences of absolute declines in a series, and not to periods of slow growth relative to trend. In business-cycle jargon, the algorithm dates "business cycles" and not "growth cycles." This will be important when interpreting the changes in prewar and postwar average phase durations for series that experienced a significant change in their trend rate of growth. Changes in trend rates of growth have obvious effects on contraction and expansion lengths: decreases in average growth rates lead to increases in average contraction duration and decreases in average expansion duration. Panel B presents results for production indicators. The first set of comparisons involves prewar pig-iron production and postwar industrial production indexes for metals and steel. In the postwar period, contractions are longer and expansions shorter, but this reduction is undoubtedly related to the decline in the growth rate of this sector. The next comparison involves prewar railroad freight ton-miles and postwar manufacturers' shipments. Again, the rapid 6Matthew Shapiro (1988) examines prewar and postwar stock price volatility and finds no significant difference between the periods. Three conclusions emerge from these data. First, they suggest that there has been little change in the average phase durations of sectoral output. This is evident from the annual data, in which many sectors were considered, and in the monthly data, which considered pig-iron production and a fixed-weight index of industrial production. The second conclusion is that these results carry over to aggregate series also. This is evident from the annual data on GNP and unemployment and the monthly data on stock prices. Third, while average phase durations do not seem to have changed, there is evidence that volatility has decreased. Many of the disaggregated series used to construct panel B of Table 2 show a significant decrease in variance for the postwar period. A reduction in variability can also be seen for many of the monthly series.
These conclusions are tempered by three caveats: first, the monthly data are very limited; second, the annual sectoral data represent production of commodities, and there are no data on the other sectors of the economy; finally, the prewar annual GNP series are less representative of the aggregate economy than the postwar series because of measurement problems documented in Balke and Gordon (1989) and Romer (1989) .
IL. Sectoral Changes
One potential explanation for the reduced cyclicality in the postwar period is the changing composition of aggregate output. This explanation is discussed in some detail in Zarnowitz and Moore (1986), who document the increasing importance of "less cyclical" relative to "more cyclical" sectors in the postwar period. Clear evidence for the importance of composition is evident in Table 1 not accurately reflect the changes in the composition of output between the prewar and postwar period. However, indexes that do reflect the typical prewar and postwar composition of the industrial sector can be constructed. Table 1 shows aggregate indexes of industrial production (manufacturing plus mining) constructed from postwar data using valueadded weights from the 1899 and 1977 Censuses. The series were constructed from the same sectoral indexes and differ only in the weights used to form the aggregated index. (The construction of the series is described in detail in the Data Appendix.) While the value-added weights changed significantly from 1899 to 1977, these changes had little effect on the average phase durations of the composite indexes. The changes in the sectoral composition of industrial production that have occurred over the 20th century appear to have had little effect on the length of expansions and contractions.10
This discussion of industrial output is somewhat beside the point, however. The major sectoral shift discussed by Zarnowitz and Moore (1986) and others is not a shift within the industrial sector, but rather the shift from the industrial sector to less cyclical sectors like services and government. Some evidence on the potential importance of this kind of sectoral change is presented in Table 3. This table shows If monthly prewar employment data were available, it would be possible to model changes in the stochastic processes governing sectoral employment across the prewar and postwar periods and to deduce implications for the changing cyclical properties of aggregate employment. Unfortunately, the only reliable prewar sectoral employment data are from the decennial census. These data can be used to estimate trends, but by 10There is evidence that higher-frequency changes in composition affect phase durations. The aggregate FRB index, which is constructed using time-varying value-added weights, has average expansions that are 12 months longer than the corresponding 1977-fixedweight index. The FRB index uses value-added weights that change every five years and so represents the evolving composition of industrial output. It should not be surprising that an index constructed using timevarying value-added weights has longer expansions than a fixed-weight index, because relative value-added covaries positively with relative quantities. This implies, for example, that during expansions relative valueadded increases for industries whose output rises more than average. Thus, an index with time-varying weights will tend to increase more than a fixed-weight index during an expansion and will tend to decrease less during a contraction. This will lead to series with a higher mean growth rate, longer average expansions, and shorter average contractions. ployment data, and average contraction and expansion lengths were calculated for the realizations. This procedure was repeated 500 times, and the resulting average phase durations are reported in the table. Two conclusions follow from the table. First, the generated aggregate postwar data have average phase durations very similar to the actual postwar aggregate employment data, and these in turn are similar to the average phase durations of NBER-dated business cycles. Thus, the Gaussian VAR model mimics the cyclical properties of the postwar data. Second, the generated prewar aggregate data have average contraction lengths similar to the postwar data and average expansion lengths more than one year longer than the postwar data. This suggests that the underlying trend behavior in the sectoral employment data would be expected to lead to less cyclical behavior in the prewar period than in the postwar period. The explanation for this result can be found in the sectoral data. Cyclical sectors such as manufacturing, mining, and transportation had larger growth rates in the prewar period and were consequently less cyclical. This feature carries over to the aggregate employment series. These conclusions are reinforced by percentiles of the empirical distributions from the 500 replications corresponding to the prewar and postwar NBER-dated business cycles. These percentiles are shown in parentheses in Table 4 While the VAR(4) fits the data well, it is not well suited for these experiments because it allows complicated dynamic interaction among the eight sectors. This makes it difficult to isolate the characteristics of the process which are responsible for the phase durations. Instead of using the VAR, the experiments are carried out using the dynamic factor model: 14 Diagnostic tests, checking the statistical adequacy of the model, are not presented. Undoubtedly, these tests would suggest that the model is too restrictive and is not an adequate statistical description of the postwar data. This should not be too troubling: the purpose of the estimated model is not to test a null hypothesis or to construct forecasts, circumstances in which the misspecification could be very important. Rather, the estimated model is to serve as a benchmark for some experiments that will give some rough answers to questions about the prewar and postwar data. A careful analysis of these and related postwar data using dynamic factor models is contained in Edwin Denson (1993 Table 5B , the model was modified by multiplying each of the factor loadings by C2 and reducing the variance of the uniquenesses by an offsetting amount. (A proportional increase in the factor loadings is observationally equivalent to increasing the standard deviation of the common factor.) This doubles the correlation between the sectors while leaving the variance of each sector unchanged. This modification lengthens average contractions and shortens average expansions, but not nearly enough to explain the prewar NBER data. In the next three rows the factor loadings are increased by varying amounts, and the uniqueness variances are unaltered. The results suggest that a dramatic increase in the covariance of the sectors is necessary to explain the results: the factor loadings need to be increased by a factor of 5, which corresponds to an increase in the covariance of the sectors by a factor of 25. This modification has a dramatic effect on the variability of the data: the standard deviation of the annual growth rate in the aggregate pseudo-prewar data is five times larger than that for the postwar data.
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This section suggests two conclusions about the effect of changes in the composition of employment on prewar and postwar cyclicality. First, differences in the trend rate of growth across sectors do not explain the differences in the prewar and postwar average phase durations. Second, very dramatic, and implausibly large changes in the covariance structure of the prewar and postwar employment data are necessary to explain the prewar average phase durations.
III. Biases in the Prewar Data
The results from Sections I and II, suggest that there is little in the data to support the claim that the postwar period has witnessed a reduction in the duration of cyclical contractions and an increase in the duration of cyclical expansions. Why is such a change evident in the NBER business-cycle chronology? One explanation is that NBER researchers chose the prewar reference dates in a way that fundamentally differed from the way that the postwar reference dates were chosen. Two possibilities suggest themselves. First, the relatively paucity of prewar data suggests that NBER researchers may have chosen reference dates for the prewar period using data that were systematically more cyclically volatile than the aggregate economy, and as more data became available, this defect was corrected in the postwar period. This would imply that the apparent postwar stabilization is due to the changing composition of series used to date the cycle; it is not due to changes in the cyclical behavior of individual series or to changes in the composition of aggregate output or employment. The second possibility is that the prewar data may have been processed differently than the postwar data. For example, the prewar data may have been detrended while the postwar data were not.
To investigate the merits of these possibilities it is useful to review the procedure that NBER researchers used to determine the prewar reference dates.15 The prewar chronology was chosen judgmentally, based on both quantitative and qualitative information. The qualitative information consisted in large part of the "business annals" collected in Willard Thrope (1926). These annals are a summary of contemporaneous reports that appeared in the business and popular press; for the United States they cover the period 1790-1925. The Thorpe annals provided an initial set of reference dates, which were then refined by examining available monthly, quarterly, and annual time series.
The quantity and quality of these data improved dramatically over the sample period covered. For example, only 19 monthly or quarterly series were available in 1860; eight of these were price series, eight were financial variables, and only three were related to production: hog receipts in Chicago, cattle receipts in Chicago, and shoe shipments from Boston. By 1930 the availability of data had changed dramatically: 710 monthly and quarterly series were available, and 245 of these related to production and personal incomes. The average prewar phase durations for the levels and detrended values of pig-iron production and bank clearings are given in Table 6 . As expected, the detrended series have longer average contractions and shorter average expansions than the levels. However, the differences are not large. For pigiron production, the difference is 2.4 months for contractions and 4.9 months for expansions. For detrended bank clearings, contractions are 2.8 months shorter, and expansions are 6.1 months longer, than the levels series. To put these differences into perspective, recall that the postwar contractions are an average of 9.8 months shorter than prewar contractions, and postwar expansions are an average of 24.6 months longer than prewar expansions. Thus, while the use of the detrended A.T.T. business index and Snyder's clearing index may have biased the average phase durations, these biases are small compared to differences in the prewar and postwar average phase du- An alternative explanation of the differences in the average prewar and postwar durations is that the data used to date the prewar cycles were systematically more volatile than aggregate activity and that this bias was eliminated in the postwar period. A simple way to investigate this explanation is to date postwar business cycles using only those indicators that were used to date the prewar cycles, that is, to "Romerize" the postwar reference dates by artificially restricting the postwar data to be as limited as the prewar data. Table 7 presents peak and trough dates for seven series covering the same range of activities as the 46 series available to Burns and Mitchell. The notable deletions from the list is any consideration of bank clearing and prices, because of the change in the drift in these series shown in Table 1 . Moreover, I have not attempted to construct postwar annals analogous to those constructed by Thorpe.19 Evident in Table 7 is a clustering of "specific cycles" for the individual series, consistent with the notion of the business cycle. While the Bry-Boschan algorithm determines turning points in individual series, it does not solve the multivariate problem of determining a "reference cycle" from a collection of series. Here, I have used judgment based on the turning points in the individual series to construct a set of reference dates. These are shown in the table along with the NBER reference dates. In selecting the reference dates, I assumed that the two production indexes were coincident indicators; that is, on average, they moved contemporaneously with the cycle. When specific cycles in these series approximately coincided, I averaged the peak and trough dates. For each production index there were specific cycles that did not correspond with movements in other series, and these were ignored when choosing the reference dates. Table 8 
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An alternative approach to determining the reference dates is to extract a single factor from a dynamic factor model estimated using these data series. Turning points in this extracted factor could then be determined by the Bry-Boschan program. I experimented with this approach but found it unsatisfactory. The results from the procedure depend critically on the variance of the factor relative to its average drift. Unfortunately, this ratio is econometrically unidentified in a factor model and must be determined judgmentally. I chose instead to apply judgment to the turning-point data directly. tractions, and shorter expansions.21 Summary statistics comparing average phase durations from these pseudo-reference dates to the NBER prewar and postwar chronologies are presented in Table 9 . These data suggest little change in the length of expansions across the prewar and postwar periods and a reduction in the length of contractions that is only half as great as suggested by the NBER chronology. Moreover, neither of the changes is statistically significant.
IV. Concluding Remarks
This paper has investigated three explanations for the postwar duration stability evident in the NBER business-cycle chronology. Little support is found for explanations that lead to duration stability across individual sectors of the economy: for most individual series, average contraction and expansion durations for the prewar and postwar periods are similar. The data also cast doubt on the changing composition of output and employment as the cause of the apparent postwar stability. Historical differences in trend growth rates of sectoral employment explain little of the observed changes in average duration. An explanation that is consistent with the data is that the prewar NBER business-cycle chronology was determined by data that, at least in the postwar period, are systematically more 21 Each of these periods corresponded to a marked slowdown in economic activity as measured by the NBER experimental coincident index. These slowdowns were not severe enough to be regarded as recessions. volatile than the aggregate economy. Thus, selection bias in the data series available to researchers in the prewar period appears to be the most likely explanation for the postwar duration stability apparent in the NBER data. Two points should be kept in mind when interpreting these conclusions. First, even though the evidence supports the view that the average lengths of prewar and postwar expansions and contractions are not significantly different, the data summarized in Tables 1 and 2 suggest a decrease in volatility, at least for many of the series studied. Thus, while business-cycle durations have remained constant, there is evidence that their amplitude has decreased. The second point is that these results should not be viewed as a criticism of the work summarized in Burns and Mitchell (1946) , ipnfo2, ipnfo5, iptexap, iplumf, ipnpr2,  ipnpr3, ipnch4, ipnch5, inpt4, ipdcl2, ipmet LPMI: To adjust for outliers, first the trend was removed from the logarithm of the series using a Hodrick-Prescott filter. Second, extreme observations (greater than three standard deviations) were set equal to the mean. Finally, this adjusted series was then added to Hodrick-Prescott trend, and the series was exponentiated.
F6TED and F6TEM: These series were seasonally adjusted using the RATS exponential moving-average procedure.
